Mazur & others v CILEX & others

The Court of Appeal has now handed down judgment in Julia Mazur & others v CILEX & others [2026] EWCA Civ 369 (the “Judgment”) providing welcome clarity on the conduct of litigation as a reserved legal activity. 
 

The Judgment confirms it is lawful for an unauthorised person (for the purposes of the reserved legal activity of conduct of litigation) to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision, provided the authorised individual put in place appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person. 

In this note, Iain Miller and Stephen Nelson (acting for the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives (CILEX) pro bono in the appeal) reflect on the Judgment handed down this morning.

The functioning of the UK litigation market has faced significant uncertainty over the past six months following the High Court finding in Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) (the “High Court Judgment”) that the Legal Services Act 2007 (the “LSA”) did not permit an unauthorised person to perform tasks which would otherwise be the conduct of litigation when working under the supervision of an authorised person.

This followed submissions made by the Law Society of England and Wales (the “Law Society”) and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (the “SRA”), were accepted and adopted by the court, namely that:

1. A non-authorised person cannot carry out the conduct of litigation under the supervision of an authorised person.
    
2. A non-authorised person can, however, support an authorised person in undertaking the conduct of litigation.

The consequences of these submissions and the High Court Judgment have been subject to extensive coverage in the legal press, with the ramifications felt by various individuals (solicitors and non-solicitors alike), businesses and not for profit providers of legal services.

It was immediately clear to many that this decision was both at odds with practice for decades, if not centuries, but also difficult to apply in practice, not least trying to navigate the distinction between providing assistance or support, as opposed to undertaking tasks under supervision. 

The conduct of litigation had always been a grey area, and now practitioners were being asked to add another layer to this by having to decide just how far support could go. This was not a comfortable position for any litigator to have to navigate, not least due to the criminal offence which could be committed. 

The first steps to appeal

One of the largest cohorts impacted by the High Court Judgment were CILEX members.  The membership of CILEX is different to those of many of the other “approved regulators” of legal services.  Many are authorised persons within the meaning of the LSA, but often only in respect of the right to administer oaths until such time as they obtain additional practice rights in respect of one of the other reserved legal activities. Many of these individuals were very experienced – see for example the press coverage in respect of Lisa Burton-Durham.  Alongside those who are authorised, are a significant number of non-authorised individuals often working in law firms, in-house legal teams or elsewhere as paralegals or equivalent. For those in both categories working in litigation teams across England and Wales, the High Court Judgment turned their world upside down.

When we received notice of the High Court Judgment, we considered that the decision was at odds with the practice of law but also with the development and subsequent regulation of the various legal professions over the past three centuries – as set out in our article for Legal Futures available here.   

Overall, the High Court Judgment had:

• Undermined the long-established practice in the legal profession (which was not fully argued before Sheldon J) of permitting unauthorised persons to carry out work which would otherwise amount to the conduct of litigation under proper supervision; - including many CILEX members and their predecessor “managing clerks”; and
   
• Created a distinction between “supporting” / “assisting” a solicitor and “conducting litigation under supervision of a solicitor”; a distinction that is unclear and unsustainable.

It was for these reasons that during a meeting with CILEX, Nick Bacon KC, Greg Cox and us, it was agreed that we would act pro bono and seek to overturn the decision.  We were subsequently joined by Helen Evans KC, Teen Jui Chow, Faye Metcalfe from 4 New Square and Phoebe Alexander from our Dispute Resolution team

Any appeal would be out of time and CILEX were not a party to the proceedings in the High Court.  Importantly, this was not by choice.  Only the Law Society and SRA were approached for submissions and the first that CILEX heard of the High Court Judgment was when it was handed down. 

Fortunately, there is precedent for non-parties to be able to appeal a judgment in certain circumstances where they were adversely affected by the outcome even where they were not a party – see George Wimpey UK Ltd v Tewkesbury BC [2008] EWCA Civ 12.  The appellant’s notice was lodged on 31 October 2025 with permission grated on 24 November 2025, with Lord Justice Bean recognising that our client’s appeal “raises an important point of practice and its significance to the legal profession as a whole is a compelling reason for an appeal to be heard”.  From there, things progressed at speed, with the hearing listed to commence on 23 February 2026.   

The Appellant’s case

At first glance, our submission on behalf of CILEX to be considered by the Court of Appeal was a relatively simple proposition:

None of the provisions of the LSA prevents an authorised person from delegating tasks in the course of carrying on the conduct of litigation to others, including steps themselves amounting to the conduct of litigation, where such work is properly supervised by the delegator. Such work is to be treated as the work of the principal/delegator who remains the person who is “carrying on” the conduct of litigation. So long as the principal retains supervision, the work will be treated as the work of the principal for the purposes of the LSA.

However, the legal basis for this proposition included the navigation of the complex development of legal regulation, and a great deal of case law which often only touched on the subject.  As stated by Sir Geoffrey Vos on day one of the appeal:

It's very interesting.  It's not simple case, actually … And the legislation is difficult because it's historical.

This can now be seen in the Judgment as Lord Justice Birss navigates case law, legislation and journals dating back to Victorian times (see paragraphs 122-148 of the Judgment). 

CILEX was joined by two further interveners, the Law Centres Network (“LCN”) and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (“APIL”), also seeking to overturn the High Court Judgment and to highlight the specific impact of the decision on their areas of legal services delivery. APIL highlighted that:

“many of its personal injury lawyer members to make significant changes to their operations and have negative consequences for them, for access to justice and for diversity in the legal profession”. 

LCN highlighted the:

“particular challenges presented by the judge’s decision, which has upended the previously understood position in relation to the conduct of litigation.  [LCN] explains that significant short-term reorganisation has been required, impeding the law centres’ ability to provide much needed free legal advice to poorer sections of society.  In the longer term, [LCN] believes that the judge’s decision risks threatening the viability of at least some law centres and reducing the amount of work they can do in a sector which is already in distress.” 

The opposition

Those seeking to uphold the High Court Judgment included Mrs Mazur, Mr Stuart, the Legal Services Board, the Law Society and the SRA.  For the purposes of this commentary, we will focus on the submissions of the Law Society and the SRA.  Both reiterated the position set out to the court below and disagreed that the position as it stood before the appeal was difficult to navigate. 

In broad terms, the Law Society submitted (see paragraph 105 of the Judgment) that:

“an authorised person cannot delegate any activity that is a reserved legal activity to an unauthorised person, save to the limited extent contemplated in the exemptions in schedule 3 to the 2007 Act.” 

During the appeal, the Law Society initially submitted that every single action which amounted to the conduct of litigation must be undertaken by an authorised person, and that it was not permissible to delegate those tasks – what the court has described in the Judgment as “universal prior approval”.  This was later withdrawn and the Law Society aligned with the position advanced by the SRA.

The SRA adopted the Law Society’s submissions but also stated there could be circumstances where delegation was permissible subject to strict protocols, albeit with little clarity on when that would be or how that could be reconciled with their interpretation of the LSA.   As noted in our submissions in reply, this qualification was important as it:

“amounted to a concession that an unauthorised person could “do” a restricted act, such as commencing proceedings, without prior approval by an authorised individual.  The only logical legal justification for this not being an example of “carrying on the conduct of litigation” by the unauthorised person must be because the authorised individual remains responsible for that act even though they have not approved it in advance.”

The Appeal Judgment

The court accepted the submissions made on behalf of CILEX, as set out at paras 19-27 and 187 of the judgment: 

“An unauthorised person can lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member.  The authorised individual retains responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person.  The authorised individual is, therefore, the person carrying on the conduct of litigation.  The unauthorised person is not carrying on the conduct of litigation and does not commit an offence.  The delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person requires proper management supervision and control, the details of which are a matter for the regulators.  In some circumstances the degree of appropriate control and supervision will be high, with approval required before things are done.  In other, for example routine, circumstances, a lower level of control and supervision will be required.  In such cases, it may be sufficient for the authorised individual to conduct regular meetings with the unauthorised person and to sample their work.  The degree of prior approval contended for by the Law Society and SRA is not required by the 2007 Act.  In short, provided the authorised individual puts in place appropriate arrangements for supervision of and delegation to unauthorised persons, those persons may perform tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation for and on behalf of the authorised individual.”

In reaching this conclusion, the following was highlighted (wording taken directly from the Judgment):

1. There has always been a widespread and well-regulated practice of delegation by solicitors to unqualified individuals.
    
2. The offence in section 14 of the 2007 Act is to be interpreted narrowly. The 2007 Act did not make a significant change from the 1990 Act in this regard.
    
3. The words “conduct of litigation” refer to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words “carry on” refer to direction and control of, and responsibility for, those tasks. 
    
4. Ndole and Baxter were cases decided in the context of an unauthorised person conducting litigation for a litigant in person.  That is not this case.  They also decided, however, that the question of whether a section 14 offence is committed is one of fact and degree and depends on whether the unauthorised person is taking responsibility for the tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation or whether the tasks are simply mechanical or administrative.
    
5. An unauthorised person may lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member, provided the authorised individual retains responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person (both formal responsibility  and the responsibilities identified at section 1(3) of the 2007 Act).  In that situation, the authorised individual is the person carrying on the conduct of litigation. 
    
6. The delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person requires proper direction, management supervision and control, the details of which are a matter for the regulators.  The authorised individual must put in place appropriate arrangements.  The degree of appropriate control and supervision will always depend on the circumstances.  This is hardly surprising.  It is described in the 1946 Managing Clerk’s article and recognised in the SRA’s 2019 guidance on solicitor’s supervision cited by the LCN in argument.  It was also reflected in a passage in the SRA’s 2022 Guidance on Effective Supervision cited by counsel for CILEX.  The concept was also inherent in the distinction drawn by the SRA and adopted by the Law Society between cases in which prior approval was required and others in which it was not.
    
7. The judge [in the court below] was wrong to distinguish between (a) supporting or assisting an authorised solicitor in conducting litigation, and (b) conducting litigation under the supervision of an authorised solicitor.  Both activities are lawful in the circumstances I have explained.  It is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision, provided the authorised individual puts in place appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person.

In doing so, Lord Justice Birss also highlighted that the decisions below were perhaps not surprising taking into account the arguments raised before them, highlighting that:

This court has heard much fuller argument than either of the courts below.  I would allow the appeal, but I do not find the result that the judge reached surprising.  The judge asked for assistance, but he did not receive as much help as could have been expected.

…both DDJ Campbell and HHJ Simpkiss were faced with shifting sands and arguments that were wrong and later abandoned.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that the Judgment will come as a welcome reassurance to many members of CILEX as well as to many law firms, solicitors and their employees, who were impacted by the High Court Judgment. 

Whilst this Judgment puts us firmly back in a position which allows the delegation of tasks, it is fundamental that appropriate arrangements for effective supervision are put, and remain, in place.  There is no doubt that the operation of the litigation market, particularly in high-volume areas, will remain a focus for the SRA and firms will need to ensure that they can demonstrate compliance with the regulator’s expectations.

Updated guidance from the SRA will likely follow, but in the meantime, we would recommend having regard to the SRA’s existing supervision guidance, with key aspects being the importance of documenting policies and processes.