Acting to stop harm: the FCA and Appointed Representatives
When things go wrong in healthcare, should the duty of candour owed by providers to patients differ depending on whether the care was provided within a primary or secondary setting? Or whether the patient received care from the public or private sector? A single duty of candour should apply consistently across the healthcare service. Unfortunately, the duty of candour is currently triggered by two different thresholds depending upon who provides care to the patient.
The patient safety charity, Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA), campaigned for many years for a statutory duty of candour. This was a major focus for the charity during its participation in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust Public Inquiry and one of the key recommendations arising from the Inquiry.
NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts and Special Health Authorities have been subject to a statutory duty of candour since November 2014 (see previous blogs here, here and here). In short, this duty requires an organisation to be open and honest with patients following certain adverse incidents. This duty is triggered by a “notifiable safety incident” having occurred which, in summary, is defined as:
Any unintended or unexpected incident that could result in, or appears to have resulted in, the death of a service user or severe harm, moderate harm, or prolonged psychological harm.
A different definition was introduced in relation to the balance of CQC registered healthcare providers in April 2015, including both primary care providers (ie. GPs) and the private sector. Whilst similar, this definition critically leaves out reference to incidents which “could” result in harm.
This simple omission may have significant consequences. For example, one of the most frequent causes of clinical negligence claim is the deprivation of oxygen to a baby during birth. Consequent learning disabilities may be evident sooner or later in childhood. If the baby was born in an NHS hospital, the Trust would be obliged to inform the parents of the incident and potential for harm upon concerns arising. If the baby was born in a private hospital, although the provider may choose to be open and honest with the parents, there is no statutory obligation upon it to do so.
The prospect of different definitions for different sectors had not been raised in the consultation issued by the Department of Health in March 2014 concerning the applicable threshold. The only explanation provided was that the definition applicable to primary and private providers would align with existing patient safety incident harm definitions requiring CQC notification. However, this apparent attempt to ease the burden upon parts of the healthcare service can surely only lead to an unjustified inconsistency of outcome for patients and inevitable confusion for those professionals who work within both public and private sectors.
In light of the potential injustice caused by two duties of candour being created, AvMA sought amendment to the draft regulations. The Department refused to reconsider the introduction of this second definition. With some reluctance, AvMA wrote to the Department last month indicating it would seek judicial review of the failure to consult upon this issue given the public interest involved. In response, the Department agreed to issue a consultation this summer. Therefore, both patients and professionals will soon have an opportunity to express their views on a single duty of candour applicable across all healthcare services. Patients are surely entitled to the same standard of candour irrespective of where they receive their care.
Action against Medical Accidents instructed Kingsley Napley LLP and Kate Beattie and Jeremy Hyam of 1 Crown Office Row in the potential judicial review proceedings above. The firm formerly represented AvMA in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry.
Attempts to narrow the scope of judicial review have long been on the Conservative Party’s political agenda. Following the Independent Review of Administrative Law (‘IRAL’) and the subsequent government consultation on reform of judicial review, the then Lord Chancellor, Robert Buckland, introduced the Judicial Review and Courts Bill (‘the Bill’) to the House of Commons on 21 July 2021. The Bill is making its way through Parliament and is currently at the committee stage.
As we highlighted in our earlier blog following the Bill’s announcement, the proposed reforms are, at first sight, milder than had been feared. Nevertheless, the Bill proposes to make significant amendments to the remedies available in judicial review proceedings and to also limit the court’s jurisdiction.
The Administrative Court of England & Wales has recently considered a challenge to its jurisdiction to hear a judicial review claim on the basis (asserted by the defendant) that the claim should be heard at the Court of Session in Scotland. As explained below, the challenge was unsuccessful, but the case is interesting not just because of the Court’s conclusion on the substantive issue but also because of His Honour Judge Simon’s approach to the “technical” (procedural) issues the case gave rise to.
Earlier this year, changes to Practice Direction 54A (covering judicial review) and 54B (covering urgent applications) came into effect. This blog will consider the impact that the changes have had on the procedure for judicial review, before turning to a recent example of the perils of failing to follow the rules.
The Judicial Review and Courts Bill contains a new ‘ouster clause’ designed to prevent judicial review of the Upper Tribunal’s decisions on certain applications for permission to appeal against decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal. This blog explores why drafting legislation to restrict judicial review is so difficult.
R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 37 and R (BF (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 38
Two linked Supreme Court judgments provide a reminder to claimants that challenges to policies should focus on whether the policies authorise or approve violations of the law. The court acknowledges that policies are issued to promote practical objectives and the standards set for reviewing them must not be unduly demanding.
Long awaited reforms to judicial review were revealed yesterday by Robert Buckland in his Judicial Review and Courts Bill. Thankfully the proposals to suspend quashing orders and limit their retrospective effect retain all-important judicial discretion and, at face value, are milder than feared. However, the decision to exclude the review of Upper Tribunal permission-to-appeal decisions (so called “Cart JRs”) is more troubling, marking the return of ouster clauses and possibly setting the groundwork for the removal of the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court in future legislation.
On 18 March 2021 the government published the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and began a public consultation on reforms to judicial review. This blog provides some initial thoughts on these important developments. For background on the IRAL see our introductory blog here.
This morning (12 February 2021) the UK Supreme Court handed down judgment in Okpabi & others v Royal Dutch Shell (“Okpabi”), a case concerning mass oil pollution in the Niger Delta. Judgment is in favour of the claimants, communities representing over 40,000 affected citizens of Nigeria, whose claim against oil conglomerate Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary can now be heard in the English courts.
On 31 July 2020 the Government launched an Independent Review of Administrative Law (‘the Review’). The panel of lawyers and academics, chaired by former Minister of State for Civil Justice Lord Edward Faulks QC (‘the Panel’), has been tasked with examining the potential need for reform of Judicial Review and to ‘consider whether the right balance is being struck between the rights of citizens to challenge executive decisions and the need for effective and efficient government.’
The Bloomsbury Institute was fighting to survive financially after the Office for Students refused its application for registration. It brought a judicial review challenge which revealed that an unpublished policy had been followed. The policy had been formulated by an official who did not have the power to make the relevant decisions.
In a February 2019 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice stated that, under international law, the decolonisation of Mauritius by the UK has never been lawfully completed and the UK must therefore “end its administration” of the Chagos islands.
Interpreting legislation is both an art and a science. This recent Court of Appeal case illustrates how judges do it in the context of the statutory scheme used to introduce controversial voter ID pilot schemes.
Even if it is generally more straightforward for the claimant to be a legal person, this judgment may give confidence to the likes of amateur sports clubs and campaigning pressure groups considering challenging the exercise of public power.
Friday 13 December 2019 will be remembered as the day the Conservatives won their biggest majority since the 1980s and finally obtained the dominance required to complete the Article 50 process and take the UK out of the EU.
Everyone has an opinion on yesterday’s decision of the UK Supreme Court. Boris Johnson said on television that he profoundly disagreed with it. Jacob Rees-Mogg reportedly called it a ‘constitutional coup’ on a cabinet conference call. Former Lord Chancellor Michael Gove was distinctly equivocal about it when interviewed on the Today programme. Laura Kuenssberg reported on Twitter that a No 10 source said ‘the Supreme Court is wrong and has made a serious mistake in extending its reach into these political matters’. The fact these people all claim they will still ‘respect’ the decision does not detract from the corrosiveness of their sentiments.
The prorogation judicial reviews concerned the constitutional equilibrium between government, parliament and the courts. Today, an 11 member UK Supreme Court panel affirmed its centuries-old supervisory jurisdiction over acts of government and ruled unanimously that Boris Johnson’s government failed to advance any reasonable justification for proroguing parliament. The prorogation was therefore unlawful and ‘never happened’ so parliament is back in the game.
Scotland’s highest court and a senior divisional court of the High Court in England and Wales have reached opposite conclusions about whether the recent decision to prorogue parliament was lawful.
Monday night’s marathon session in Parliament saw a number of issues debated into the small hours and further defeats for the government. While many raised important political and legal issues, one of particular interest to information lawyers, followers of Parliamentary procedure and journalists alike was the endorsement of a “Humble Address” motion brought by former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve.
On 24 July 2019, the High Court handed down judgment in R (on the application of Independent Workers Union Of Great Britain and others) v Mayor Of London  EWHC 1997 (Admin). This case related to the decision in December 2018 by the Mayor of London to remove an exemption and require private hire vehicles (“PHV”) to pay the Congestion Charge from 8 April 2019
According to the most recent data, two million people in London are living with illegal levels of air pollution. Nitrogen dioxide is one of the main pollutants and road transport is estimated to be responsible for 50% of total emissions.
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