Data protection v defamation as a means to protect reputation – where are we now and what can we expect in 2026?

There has been a trend in recent years of seeking to use data protection claims as a means of obtaining redress for reputational harm, which would traditionally have been sought through defamation proceedings.
 

This trend reflects the challenges claimants face when pursuing defamation claims, including the one-year limitation period, procedural complexity and the necessity of proving serious reputational harm. However, this alternative route is by no means straightforward, and the courts are having to grapple with whether defamation principles, developed over many years to balance competing privacy and freedom of expression rights, should apply to these novel data protection claims.

This issue came under judicial scrutiny in 2024 in Pacini v Dow Jones, where the judge acknowledged that the state of the law on the recoverability of damages for injury to reputation in non-defamation claims is “uncertain and in flux” and noted that these issues “raise questions of principle that may require appellate court determination."

In 2025, there was a significant case in which this approach was once again adopted – Vince v Associated Newspapers Limited [2025]. The Vince case is another example of the tension between traditional defamation principles and recent data protection legislation, playing out in practice – and why 2026 may bring critical appellate guidance on this issue.

Background
 

Mr Vince, an environmental activist and political donor, initially pursued defamation proceedings against Associated Newspapers in relation to an article it published in the Daily Mail and Mail+, which included two photographs of Mr Vince, under the headline “Labour repays £100,000 to sex pest donor”. Mr Vince’s defamation claim was brought on the basis of an innuendo meaning, that the combination of the headline and photographs gave the misleading impression that he had been accused of sexual harassment, and a substantial number of readers would have understood this without reading the whole article.

The claim was struck out on the basis of the well-established defamation principle in Charleston v NGN [1995] that a claim in libel cannot be founded on a headline or photograph in isolation of the article itself. The Judge found that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words should be taken from the article as a whole, in which it was clear that Mr Vince was not being accused of sexual harassment, and Mr Vince was not able to get around this rule by way of the alleged innuendo meaning of the headline and photographs.

Data protection claim
 

Mr Vince subsequently advanced a data protection claim, based on the same facts as his defamation claim, to seek redress for the alleged damage to his reputation. Specifically, Mr Vince claimed that the inclusion of the photographs alongside the “sex pest donor” headline amounted to unfair processing of his personal data, in breach of Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR.

Associated Newspapers sought to strike out the claim on the basis that it was an abuse of process (as the defamation and data protection claims should have been brought together). Both parties also made applications for summary judgment and effectively agreed that a trial was not necessary to determine whether or not Mr Vince’s personal data was processed fairly by Associated Newspapers.

The Judge had to consider whether the rule in Charleston should be applied, i.e. whether fairness could be assessed on the headline and photographs alone or on the basis of an ordinary, reasonable reader’s view of the entire publication.

The law
 

The Judge considered the case of NT1 v Google LLC [2019], where Warby J held that the Charleston rule was not out of place in data protection claims and stressed the need for coherence with defamation principles, even if it is possible to give literal accuracy more weight in data protection claims. He also considered Pacini v Dow Jones [2024], where the Court applied defamation concepts — the ‘single meaning’ rule and ‘repetition’ rule — to determine the meaning of the data alleged to be inaccurate under data protection law.

On this basis, the Judge concluded that context is critical when assessing fairness in the processing of personal data. In this case, the Judge found that where the primary harm alleged is reputational, the entire publication — not just a headline or photograph — must be considered.

The Judge emphasised that rules developed in defamation are important to strike a balance between public interest and an individual’s privacy rights – and whilst the law of defamation is not the law of data protection – where the primary harm alleged is reputational, the law would be inconsistent if fairness was assessed in a way contrary to defamation principles.

Mr Vince’s claim was ultimately struck out as an abuse of process, but the Judge confirmed that he would have granted Associated Newspapers summary judgement in any event, on the basis that Mr Vince’s data was processed fairly, so his claim had no real prospect of success.

What we can expect in 2026
 

In October 2025, Warby J granted Mr Vince permission to appeal the decision of the High Court. In the order granting permission to appeal, Warby J highlighted the issues judges have had to grapple with, when considering whether to apply defamation rules, such as that of Charleston and the ‘single meaning rule’, “… both are rules of law that tend to protect freedom of expression but can, at least arguably, lead to unfairness in individual cases…”, and acknowledged that the issues raised have “wide implications.”

The appeal will hopefully provide some well needed clarity on whether defamation principles should apply to data protection claims, where reputational harm is alleged. The decision will be significant, as it could limit the scope of data protection claims if the principles are deemed to apply, and if they are deemed not to, and fairness of processing under UK GDPR should be assessed independently, it may open the door to more claims seeking to circumvent longstanding defamation principles.

About the author

Jessica is an associate in the Dispute Resolution team and has particular expertise in media, privacy and reputation management matters.