On 8 November 2018, almost 17 months out of time, Mary Jane Cowan made an application under Section 4 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for permission to make an application under Section 2 of that Act against the estate of her deceased husband, Michael Anthony Cowan (Cowan v Foreman,  EWHC 349 Fam).
For those who find themselves the unfortunate victims of blackmail, often in cases which concern sexually explicit information (‘sextortion’), the choice of how to respond can be extraordinarily difficult. As discussed in our earlier blog, one of the possible responses is to report the matter to the police, which may then result in a subsequent prosecution of the blackmailer.
The Cliff Richard privacy judgment was thought to be a landmark case when it comes to press reporting of a police investigation. Headlines following the judgment included “The Cliff Richard judgment is a chilling blow to press freedom” and “Cliff Richard privacy judgment threatens press freedom”. Whilst the result was a positive end to a terrible experience for Cliff Richard, has it really changed how the press report allegations? In this blog, we explore whether the ruling is taken into account when reporting on other types of investigations.
In the recent High Court judgment of Monir v Wood , the Court held the Defendant liable for a defamatory tweet, even though he did not post or have knowledge of the tweet at the time. The Defendant was also held liable for failing to remove the defamatory material once it was brought to his attention.
The recent Court of Appeal judgment in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP  re-enforces that the correct approach in professional negligence cases is to distinguish between ‘information’ and ‘advice’ cases when considering the extent to which a professional may be liable. The decision confirms that the distinction is necessary, important and requires consideration of the extent of any assumed responsibility.