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From garage to unicorn – Employment law lessons for scaling tech teams
Catherine Bourne
The right to appeal against the decision of a local licensing authority has recently been under the judicial spotlight. In particular, the courts have been grappling with the tricky question as to the extent to which the appeal court is entitled to hear evidence and decide the matter afresh. Important principles emerge which will be relevant to those involved in, and affected by, decisions under the Licensing Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”).
The case of R (on the application of Puri) v Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2011] EWHC 970 (Admin), considered whether or not a claimant’s Article 6 right to an impartial and independent hearing was engaged in disciplinary proceedings. On the facts it was held that Article 6 did not apply, as the decision of the Panel would not prevent Mr Puri practising as a doctor, but would only impact his current employment.
In Jones v Kaney, the Supreme Court had to determine whether public policy permits the retention of the immunity enjoyed by expert witnesses in claims by their own client for breach of a duty of care, contractual or tortious. Overruling the decision in Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75, a majority of 5-2 (Lord Hope and Lady Hale dissenting) held it did not. Less than one month later, in the case of Baxendale-Walker v Middleton, the honourable Mr Justice Supperstone, sitting in the Queen’s Bench Division, upheld the immunity of expert witnesses as a defence to tortuous claims. This apparent contradiction is not however an example of a judgment decided per incuriam. Rather, it is a judgment illustrating the fine line drawn by the Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney.
D was an equity partner in a firm of solicitors (‘the Firm’). Prior to joining the Firm, D had acted for an organisation that operated a Claims Management Scheme (‘the Scheme’) for personal injury claimants. When D joined the Firm in 1998, he introduced them to the Scheme and they were subsequently appointed to the Scheme’s panel. Concurrently, D also acquired a one third share in a company (‘the Company’) that was used by the Scheme to supply medical reports for claimants.
The appellant doctor, K, appealed her twelve month suspension by the General Medical Council (GMC) after the Panel found her fitness to practise was impaired by reason of her misconduct. In 2008, K was convicted on three out of twenty-six allegations of dishonesty when the Panel decided she had knowingly made false representations to a colleague, defrauding him of £188,000.
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