Trust and Estate Disputes Quarterly Round-Up: April - June 2024

This contentious trust and probate litigation round-up provides a summary of a cross-section of reported decisions handed down in the courts of England and Wales in the period April 2024 - June 2024.

Davies v Watts, 2024 EWHC 1177 Ch

The High Court has proved a handwritten will, dismissing a counterclaim by the deceased’s half-sister on the grounds of lack of capacity or want of knowledge and approval.

Philip Price (the Deceased) made a will on 14 December 2018 (the Will), leaving his estate to a friend, Vanessa Davies (the Claimant). The Will was handwritten but prepared by a solicitor. It was signed around 24 hours after the Deceased was discharged from hospital after suffering from pneumonia and possibly sepsis, and during which time he had suffered from a period of acute serious delirium. The Deceased experienced further periods of delirium following his discharge. The Deceased also had an autoimmune condition and a cancer diagnosis. He passed on 10 January 2019. Shortly after the Deceased’s death, Barbara Watts (the Defendant) became aware that she was his half-sister. 

The will writer, a senior partner at a law firm local to the Deceased, met with him on 14 December 2018. She gave evidence to the effect that she spent over an hour with the Deceased and drafted a simple will in his presence before going through it with him and giving it to him to read directly.  The will writer was asked in cross-examination why she did not obtain medical confirmation of capacity, to which she responded that she did not believe that the Deceased’s capacity was compromised and that it was “a sort of sixth sense”.

The Claimant and the Defendant each obtained expert reports and a joint statement was also prepared. Both experts agreed that there was a possibility of continuing delirium in the relevant period, and in the case of the Defendant’s expert that this could have undermined testamentary capacity, whereas the Claimant’s expert said that if it was continuing, it was more than likely that this would be mild and unlikely that it would have undermined testamentary capacity.

In the face of inconclusive medical evidence, the court placed considerable weight on the “clear and straightforward evidence of capacity” given by the Claimant and her witnesses, making a clear finding that the Deceased had testamentary capacity. His Honour Judge Jarman KC said that this finding went a long way in addressing the question of whether the Deceased knew and approved of the contents of his will. He noted that the will was written in capital letters on one page and that its terms were not complex. He accepted the evidence of the will writer and concluded that it was clear that the Deceased knew and approved of the contents of the Will.

Dryden v Young 2024 EWHC 1095 Ch

The High Court has been asked to determine the true construction of certain gifts of residue in the will of Marjorie Thompson (Deceased) dated 26 May 2016 (the Will). The residue of the estate was given in equal shares to 15 different organisations. For 7 of which, it fell to the court to decide the validity of the gift and the identity of the organisation intended to be benefited. The Deceased’s estate was valued at approximately £1.5 million. The will writer had retired and his only recollection was that he had relied on the list of charities provided to him by the Deceased.

The general principles of construction were not disputed:

"In construing a will the object of the court is to ascertain the intention of the testator as expressed in their will when it is read as a whole in the light of any extrinsic evidence available for the purposes of construction".

Theobald on Wills (19th edn)

And it was necessary to, therefore apply the well-established principles of construction developed in the context of commercial contracts, but adapted to (i) reflect that in the case of a will, one is not looking at a transaction between two or more parties but a document effected by one person and (ii) the importance of the general consequences of a will and common sense as opposed to a focus on commerciality.

The court also had to consider the impact of clause 13 of the Will, which precluded a charity from benefiting if it had changed its name or merged before the estate was distributed. His Honour Judge Davis-White KC considered that the clause was prospective and, therefore, only applied to events taking place after the date of the will and consequently did not apply.

The court decided that all seven of the gifts were valid, seeking to uphold the intentions of the testator and provide clarity on distribution. Three of the charities included in the Will had never existed, but the court identified organisations with similar names - The Home Rest for Horses was the Horseworld Trust (which according to the charity register, had working names including Home of Rest for Horses and the Rest Home for Horses), The Heavy Horses Preservation Society was the Shire Horse Society (the only charity with the specific purpose of the welfare of shire horses) and The Society for the Preservation of English Countryside was the Campaign to Protect Rural England. The Society for Promotion of Nature Reserves had been renamed The Royal Society for Wildlife Trusts. The Animal Defence Society no longer existed but was now the Animal Defence Trust. The Donkey Sanctuary had moved from Berkshire to Devon. And whilst the Animal Health Trust was in liquidation, the bequest could be paid to the creditors.

Langley v Qin

The County Court has followed the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rea v Rea 2024 EWCA Civ 169 in determining a case around alleged predatory marriage and a will contested on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval and undue influence.

Robert Harrington (the Deceased) died on 26 May 2020, aged 94 years old. He had one child from his first marriage of 66 years, Jill Langley (the Claimant). The Deceased was remarried on 25 June 2019 to Guixiang Qin (the Defendant), aged 54 years old. The Deceased made a will dated 24 March 2020 (the Will), through which he left his estate to the Defendant and her son. The Claimant alleged that the Deceased’s marriage to the Defendant was a predatory marriage and that she was, in fact, his paid carer (however, did not seek to formally challenge the Deceased’s capacity to marry). The Claimant asked that the Court pronounce against the Will.

Expert evidence was provided to the court by Dr Hugh Series who concluded that the Deceased was “most likely suffering from a paranoid delusional disorder arising in the context of failing cognitive function” and that it was “more likely than not that his delusions about his daughter’s behaviour towards him had poisoned his mind and led to his excluding her from his will” concluding that he lacked capacity. Dr Series also expressed a view that the Deceased was vulnerable to undue influence.

The court’s attention was drawn to Rea v Rea and in particular, the conclusion of Lord Justice Newey around civil burden and standard of proof generally in the context of undue influence:

“…I would accept that undue influence can be proved without demonstrating that the circumstances are necessarily inconsistent with any alternative hypothesis. On the other hand, the circumstances must be such that undue influence is more probable than any other hypothesis. If another possibility is just as likely, undue influence will not have been established. When making that assessment, moreover, it may well be appropriate to proceed on the basis that undue influence is inherently improbable.”

The court accepted the evidence of Dr Series finding that the Deceased lacked testamentary capacity. As to want of knowledge the court found the evidence of the Defendant “unsatisfactory” and indicated a “significant element if impropriety” in her conduct thus finding that the burden to establish that the Deceased did know and approve the contents of the Will had not been discharged. The court also noted that it had no confidence that the Deceased had read the draft will himself and that he had some visual and auditory limitation. The claim succeeded on want of knowledge. Finally, the claim also succeeded on undue influence. Recorder Robert McAllister said, “There was clearly an element of control by the First Defendant of the Deceased and his finances that increased over time”. He also noted that the evidence suggested “a guiding hand” which he found to be the Defendants and that an inference could be drawn by the Defendant's lack of disclosure of matters that could have assisted. 

If a predatory marriage is set aside for lack of capacity, it is only cancelled from the point that it is declared to be void, and the marriage, therefore, stands for the purpose of an intestacy at the time of the deceased’s passing. For more detail on predatory marriages, see our previous blog on this subject here.

Heyes v Holt [2024] EWHC 779 (Ch)

The High Court has dismissed an application for summary judgment in a proprietary estoppel claim on a conditional basis. 

The underlying claim relates to two properties in Cornwall. Patrick Holt (the Deceased) passed on 22 March 2020 survived by his wife, Sarah Holt (the Defendant). The Deceased had three children. One of his daughters and her husband (the Claimants) are pursuing a claim against the Defendant personally and in her capacity as executrix of the Deceased’s estate premised on their position that the Deceased wished the farm to continue to be farmed by his descendants and his stated intentions with respect to certain parts of the land and property on it.

The Defendant said that (i) the assurances pleaded were too uncertain in extent to be the foundation of a proprietary estoppel claim (ii) the documentary evidence shows that any assurances were neither intended nor apparently intended to be relied upon and (iii) it is clear from the evidence that the claimants knew that no sufficiently clear assurances had been given and they were not intended to be relied on. 

The court considered these to be powerful arguments and noted that it would not be easy for the claimants to surmount them at trial. However, it was not the purpose of the summary judgment hearing to conduct a trial of the claim. Where the court was being asked to end the claim without a trial on the basis that the claimants had no real prospect, or only an unreal, illusory or theoretical prospect, of success at trial the threshold to be met by the defendant is high.

The court concluded that whilst the case was weak it was not so weak that it could be said it only had a fanciful of theoretical prospect of success and consequently Mr  Justice Matthews could not grant summary judgment. However, in making the application, the Defendant had also sought a conditional order pursuant to CPR 24.6, which allows the court, when determining a summary judgment application, to do so subject to the conditions in CPR 3.1(3). These allow the court to make an order subject to conditions, including a condition to pay a sum of money into court and specify the consequences of failure to comply with the order or conditions. 

Mr Justice Matthews made an order dismissing the application for summary judgment, and thus permitting the matter to go to trial, but conditional on the claimants' paying a sum of money into court, with the sanction of dismissal of the claim if this was not done within a specified time. A stay was also ordered for mediation and further disclosure directed from the claimants.

About the author
 
Katherine Pymont is a Partner in the Dispute Resolution Team who specialises in Trust and Estate Disputes. Her experience in the field of Trust and Inheritance Disputes covers challenging the validity of wills (including claims for lack of testamentary capacity, want of knowledge and approval, fraud, forgery and undue influence), claims under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, removal of executors and trustees, breach of trust claims, fraud cases involving trust structures and professional negligence claims relating to wills and trusts.