26 October 2026

ECCTA and the SRA’s unlimited fining power: how far does it really extend?

Without fanfare, the SRA has this month submitted a formal application to the Legal Services Board (“LSB”) seeking approval of revised guidance on financial penalties given to it by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (“ECCTA”).

The guidance looks, at last, to bring into effect the SRA’s new power to impose unlimited financial penalties for certain conduct connected with economic crime, without referral to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“SDT”). This applies to breaches that occurred after the enactment of the ECCTA, that is those that arose on or after 4 March 2024.

The SRA’s previous consultation proposals, in 2024 (can you believe it was that long ago?!) generated sufficiently strong (adverse) feedback from the profession that the SRA ultimately withdrew them and, rightly, reconsidered its approach. While much of the rhetoric around the implementation of the new powers has focused on the size of the penalties that will soon be available to the SRA, the more interesting question, for us at least, is the scope of the power conferred by the ECCTA.

A quick recap

Prior to the enactment of the relevant ECCTA provision (section 207(1)), the SRA’s fining powers for recognised bodies and solicitors were capped at £25,000, with referral to the SDT required for the imposition of higher fines. ECCTA changed that, giving the SRA the power to impose an unlimited financial penalty for certain conduct connected with economic crime, as defined by the ECCTA (referred to here as “economic crime breaches”).

As with its existing fining powers, the SRA has not lost the ability to refer economic crime breaches to the SDT, so the same economic crime breach may now be dealt with directly or by the SDT, entirely at the SRA’s discretion.

More discretion, less consistency?

Now that the SRA can impose unlimited fines for certain economic crime issues, the question of whether it deals with a matter itself or refers it to the SDT carries considerably more significance than it previously did.

As under the current fining framework, the SRA retains discretion to refer a case to the SDT where it considers it to be more appropriate (i.e. in more serious cases or where facts are disputed). In its application to the LSB, the SRA indicates that in future, where conduct falls within the scope of ECCTA and it determines such conduct to warrant a fine above £25,000, the usual approach will be for that fine to be imposed directly by the SRA rather than refer the matter to the SDT (paragraph 11 of the application): a presumption as to the use of internal fining powers.

In cases where the facts and matters alleged are accepted, the additional head room for internal fines may be advantageous for firms, allowing matters to be resolved quickly and at lower cost. The same cannot be said for a firm that disagrees with the decision maker’s assessment of seriousness or penalty. Given the size of financial penalty now available to the SRA, firms who dispute its findings may wish to have had the reassurance of an independent SDT decision. Whilst there exists a right to appeal most SRA enforcement decisions to the SDT, the nature of an appeal hearing is very different to a first instance one, not least because on an appeal the SDT is confined to reviewing the SRA’s sanctioning decision, rather than hearing the case afresh.

There is also a question over how the SRA will choose to resolve matters where there is a mixture of economic crime-related breaches which can be dealt with under the new power, and non-economic crime breaches for which it is limited in its ability to impose financial penalties.

Analysing the source of the new power

The SRA’s new discretion carries considerable implications and has prompted serious questions about whether the power will be used as Parliament envisaged.

The ECCTA does not create a new standalone fining power. Instead, it is parasitic upon the SRA’s existing power under s44D(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974, which provides that a reprimand or financial penalty may be issued if the SRA is satisfied that either a solicitor / employee of a solicitor has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of The Solicitors Act 1974, the Administration of Justice Act 1985 or rules made by the SRA, or that there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor.

To this provision, the ECCTA overlays a new power to impose an unlimited fine where the conduct additionally falls within one of three new grounds. It is important to note that the new grounds do not displace the gateway requirements in s44D(1).

What conduct is in scope for an unlimited fine?

The three grounds for which an unlimited fine will now be available are detailed at section 44D(2B) of The Solicitors Act 1974:

Ground 1: “a failure to comply with a requirement or rule that applies only for purposes relating to the prevention or detection of economic crime” (s44D(2B)(a)(i))

Ground 2: a failure to comply where that failure “had the effect of inhibiting the prevention or detection of economic crime” (s44D(2B)(a)(ii))

Ground 3: misconduct that “had the effect of inhibiting the prevention or detection of economic crime” (s44D(2B)(b))

(Emphasis added)

“Economic crime” is defined in the ECCTA by reference to Schedule 11, which itemises specific criminal offences including theft, fraud, false accounting, bribery, tax evasion, money laundering, funding of terrorism, and breach of financial sanctions arrangements. Attempts and conspiracies are expressly also within scope.

Ground 1: the “only” problem

The SRA has said that it will seek to rely on the provision in s44D(2B)(a)(i) – Ground 1 – to impose penalties above £25,000 for breaches of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (“MLRs”), given that they fall within the broad definition of “economic crime” in the ECCTA.

It is far from clear however how MLR breaches would properly fit within the scope of this provision.

The MLRs are made under separate primary legislation, entirely independent of the Solicitors Act 1974 and the Administration of Justice Act 1985 framework; nor is there an SRA rule which directly gives effect to them. MLR breaches do not therefore appear to fall within the s44D(1)(a) gateway, and so could not engage ground 1 under s44D(2B)(a)(i). The SRA may seek to link MLR breaches to its Codes or Principles, but these are broad professional conduct obligations and do not expressly require compliance with the MLRs. Even if the MLRs were incorporated into the SRA’s regulatory framework, the relevant provision would need to be one that “applies only” for purposes relating to the prevention or detection of economic crime.

If that analysis is correct, straightforward MLR breaches would not engage this ground, meaning the category of conduct caught by s44D(2B)(a)(i) may be considerably narrower than it first appeared.

Ground 2: the evidential threshold

Ground 2 (under s44D(2B)(a)(ii)) provides that a failure to comply that “had the effect of inhibiting the prevention or detection of economic crime” does not require an anterior breach of a requirement or rule that applies “only” for the purposes of economic crime. As a result, it is far broader, allowing the SRA to rely on breaches of the MLRs (or similar legislation) by arguing that they also amount to a breach of a code requirement, for example rule 2.1(a) of the Code of Conduct for Firms (which requires effective governance controls to ensure compliance with SRA regulatory and other legislative requirements, and is oft cited for MLR breaches). It does however require the failure to have had the effect of inhibiting prevention or detection of economic crime. This is an outcomes-based test and appears to impose a high evidential burden. A merely theoretical or potential inhibiting effect is unlikely to be sufficient. The SRA’s LSB application is silent on what standard of evidence would be required to establish when a failure has “had the effect” necessary to satisfy this test.

Ground 3: professional misconduct and the same threshold

This ground is again broader than Ground 1 as it relies on the SRA’s ability to issue reprimands or penalties under s44D(1)(b) Solicitors Act 1974, that is to say, where there has been professional misconduct. The same evidential issue arises however, as it is not clear what misconduct might properly be said to have the effect of inhibiting the prevention or detection of economic crime.

Where does all of that leave us?

The manner in which the SRA exercises its new powers will rightly be subject to close scrutiny. Jurisdictional questions ought to feature in that analysis. That the regulated community is prepared to push back is clear: several high-profile challenges in the past year have demonstrated that they will not hesitate to challenge SRA action that strays beyond the lawful boundaries of its statutory powers.

Let’s not begin to consider the impact on all of this of the planned transfer of responsibility for supervision of the MLRs to the FCA…

If you need guidance on any of the issues outlined in this article, contact our legal services regulatory specialists.

About the authors

Tarah Morris is a public and regulatory lawyer who advises clients on a wide range of regulatory and professional discipline matters. She supports large law firms and individuals on SRA-related matters, including general compliance following Mazur (such as effective supervision), reportability, conflicts of interest and ongoing investigations.

Julie Norris specialises in legal services regulation, advising law firms, partners, barristers, judges and chambers on investigations, enforcement and the regulatory issues that affect their practice. Alongside her contentious work, she advises clients on the full range of non‑contentious SRA regulatory issues, including authorisation, conflicts, AML, overseas practice, reporting obligations and regulatory due diligence for law‑firm mergers, acquisitions and private equity investments.

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