The UK Government’s Security Service (MI5) has issued an Espionage Alert concerning the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI). Such alerts are exceptionally rare and signal that MI5 considers the threat sufficiently serious and specific to warrant direct public warning to the academic sector. Universities should treat this alert with the utmost urgency, reviewing their research arrangements immediately and ensuring staff are aware of the criminal offences created by the National Security Act 2023.
Published on 30 September, the alert states that CGTRI has “very strong ties to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s civilian intelligence and security service“. MI5 further assesses that CGTRI’s principal function is to “fund research that directly improves” the MSS’s technical espionage capabilities. CGTRI funds academic research on topics including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, covert communications systems and steganography, all areas with direct application to state-level espionage.
MI5 has identified that more than 100 academics affiliated with UK institutions have contributed to research projects funded by the MSS through CGTRI. Importantly, MI5 acknowledges that in some cases academics may not have been aware that CGTRI was the ultimate funder of the Chinese research project they were contributing to. Many institutions and individuals will therefore have engaged with CGTRI in good faith, given CGTRI’s deliberately obfuscated links to MSS. That position has now fundamentally changed.
The publication of this alert has significant and immediate implications for universities and their staff.
UK academic institutions are strongly advised to immediately review any ongoing or planned collaboration with CGTRI. The purpose of this review is to ensure that MSS derives no further benefit from UK universities or research institutions. Institutions should also identify the ultimate source of funding in any collaborative projects with Chinese institutions, to establish whether CGTRI is involved.
When scoping any future research collaborations, institutions should make full use of HMG’s Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) and the Trusted Research guidance produced by the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA). These resources are designed to help institutions assess the risks associated with international research partnerships. Institutions should also consider taking independent legal advice as recommended in the alert.
The NSA is landmark legislation which repeals the Official Secrets Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1939 and creates a range of new criminal offences relevant to universities and their staff.
By publishing this alert, MI5 has placed CGTRI’s ties to MSS firmly in the public domain. This has critical legal consequences. Going forward, universities, staff and researchers can no longer claim unawareness of CGTRI’s connection to a foreign intelligence service. The MSS, as an agency of the Chinese government, clearly falls within the NSA’s broad definition of a “foreign power”. MI5 specifically highlights two offences of which all institutions, staff and researchers should be aware:
- Section 3 (Assisting a Foreign Intelligence Service): An offence is committed where a person engages in conduct likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities and knows or ought reasonably to know that their conduct is likely to have that effect.
- Section 17 (Obtaining a Material Benefit from a Foreign Intelligence Service): This offence captures those who receive a material benefit, such as research funding, from a foreign intelligence service.
A number of NSA offences carry penalties extending to life imprisonment. The offences also carry fines, meaning that universities as corporate bodies can themselves face criminal liability.
Of particular concern for university leadership is section 35 of the NSA. Where an NSA offence is committed by a corporate body, such as a university, senior individuals within that institution can themselves be guilty of a criminal offence if the corporate offence was committed with their consent, connivance, or neglect. The threshold of mere neglect is notably low and means that senior leaders who fail to take adequate steps to identify and address CGTRI involvement in their institution’s research activities could face personal criminal liability.
At the very least, all institutions should immediately review their existing and current research projects to establish whether CGTRI funding is involved and if so what action needs to be taken. Where it is or where any doubt remains, independent legal advice should be taken without delay, in particular in relation to the offences under sections 3 and 17 of the National Security Act 2023.
Should you require any advice on any of the matters covered in this article, please contact Nicola Finnerty.
