Brexit – take back control over your immigration status

On 16 November the CJEU delivered its judgment following the publication of the Advocate General’s opinion on the UK-Ireland extradition questions which we wrote about here. The decision concerned the mechanisms for extradition to the UK from Ireland in two scenarios (1) under the terms of the withdrawal agreement from 1 February to 31 December 2020 and (2) under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”) from 1 January 2021.

The judgment confirms the AG’s Opinion that Ireland is bound by the withdrawal agreement and the TCA (“the agreements”) in respect of extradition arrangements with the UK and accordingly extradition from Ireland to the UK post-Brexit will continue under those terms.

On 9 November 2021 Advocate General Kokott handed down her opinion in respect of Case C-479/21 concerning Mr Sn and Mr Sd following a reference from the Irish Supreme Court which was made on 3 August 2021. Her opinion stated that the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement and TCA which ensure the continuation of the European arrest warrant regime in respect of warrants issued by the United Kingdom (“UK”) during the transition period are binding on Ireland.

One of the key themes of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to retain Parliamentary sovereignty, or “Take Back Control.” This blog focuses on that aspect of Brexit and revisits previous discussions around delegated legislation and Parliamentary sovereignty to assess the effect of the past 9 months on our Parliament.

Rebecca Niblock and Edward Grange examine the key changes & similarities to extradition law following Brexit. The introduction of new surrender arrangements under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Changes effected under the Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Act 2020.

The Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, has approved the new guideline hourly rates (GHR) proposed by the CJC and the Stewart committee which will come into effect on 1st October 2021.
These new rates are a result of the final report of the Civil Justice Council released at the end of July 2021 and the forerunning consultation that took place between 8 January and 31 March 2021.

From being the centrepiece of England’s post-Covid recovery with ‘eat out to help out’, the hospitality sector is now struggling to rebuild after lockdowns, furlough and rising food prices. At the same time many restaurants, cafes and pubs are coming up against the hard realities of a post-Brexit immigration policy and discovering what it means for their business.

Perhaps the first practical negative consequence for the UK to emerge “Beyond Brexit” from an extradition perspective relates to Article 83 of the TCA which allows EU Member States to refuse to extradite their own nationals to the UK. Germany, Austria and Slovenia had already exercised the Nationality bar during the transition period, which ended on 31 December 2020.

The potential fallout from Brexit for extradition and cross-border criminal justice security had been forewarned even before the first vote was cast in the Referendum. The risks to the UK of losing access to SIS II and complicating a relatively simple (albeit not perfect) EAW process were highlighted by many practitioners, law enforcement agencies and politicians.

Deal or no deal, when the UK’s transition agreement expires at 11pm on 31 December 2020 the country will no longer participate in EU sanctions arrangements or otherwise give effect to EU sanctions regimes. Instead, it will operate a two tier system, devising its own sanctions policies and measures which will be supplemented by sanctions measures imposed as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 

The Internal Market Bill (the “Bill”) has caused a dramatic fallout at home and abroad. It has faced massive defeats in the House of Lords over the month on November. It was the reported reason behind the UK’s most senior legal civil servant announcing his departure from the Government Legal Service.

As the end of the Brexit transition period draws near, complexities associated with navigating cross-border regulatory regimes have been increasingly brought to the fore. The Law Society of Ireland’s announcement last week, confirming a ‘physical presence’ requirement for solicitors intending to practise in Ireland, has highlighted wider post-Brexit issues surrounding residency requirements and recognition of qualifications for regulated professionals on the British/Irish border.

The Supreme Court recently made clear in Villiers v Villiers [2020] UKSC 30 that divorcing in one EU country does not prevent a party from making a separate claim for maintenance from their spouse in England and Wales. The case therefore demonstrates the possibility of ‘forum shopping’, where a party seeks to bring a financial claim in a jurisdiction (country) that is more convenient or provides a more generous maintenance provision than the jurisdiction in which the divorce is taking place. However, the loophole relies on an application of the EU Maintenance Regulation which will cease to be in force in the UK on 31 December 2020. This blog considers the case of Villiers and how Brexit will affect the current position.

Friday 13 December 2019 will be remembered as the day the Conservatives won their biggest majority since the 1980s and finally obtained the dominance required to complete the Article 50 process and take the UK out of the EU. 

At the time of writing, the UK is on the cusp of a General Election where Brexit is high on the agenda.  In this blog, Stacey Nevin considers a number of scenarios and the changes that people who have connections with England and another EU member state might encounter for divorces, financial proceedings and matters concerning children in the event of a no deal Brexit.

At the time of writing, it is possible that the UK could exit the EU on 31 October 2019 (“exit date”) without a deal which means immediately leaving EU institutions such as the European Court of Justice without an agreement over what happens next.

Everyone has an opinion on yesterday’s decision of the UK Supreme Court. Boris Johnson said on television that he profoundly disagreed with it. Jacob Rees-Mogg reportedly called it a ‘constitutional coup’ on a cabinet conference call. Former Lord Chancellor Michael Gove was distinctly equivocal about it when interviewed on the Today programme. Laura Kuenssberg reported on Twitter that a No 10 source said ‘the Supreme Court is wrong and has made a serious mistake in extending its reach into these political matters’. The fact these people all claim they will still ‘respect’ the decision does not detract from the corrosiveness of their sentiments.

The prorogation judicial reviews concerned the constitutional equilibrium between government, parliament and the courts. Today, an 11 member UK Supreme Court panel affirmed its centuries-old supervisory jurisdiction over acts of government and ruled unanimously that Boris Johnson’s government failed to advance any reasonable justification for proroguing parliament. The prorogation was therefore unlawful and ‘never happened’ so parliament is back in the game.

Tucked in between the “reasonable worst-case” scenarios for food, trade and fuel is a stark one liner: “Law enforcement and information sharing between U.K. and EU will be disrupted”. The reduction in capability of law enforcement agencies that will come from a no deal will, according to government documents, be accompanied by an increase in cross-border crime.

Scotland’s highest court and a senior divisional court of the High Court in England and Wales have reached opposite conclusions about whether the recent decision to prorogue parliament was lawful.

Katie Newbury discusses the implications of a no-deal Brexit on free movement and the impact on Europeans living in the UK.